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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 June 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

NO

*East Germany: Bonn's announcement that the West German presidential election will be held in West Berlin on 1 July will probably provoke minor harassments and stepped-up propaganda attacks by the East Germans. They will probably not, however, take actions serious enough to prevent the holding of the assembly in Berlin.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

DK

Union of South Africa: The native rioting which broke out on 18 June in the important seaport of Durban was apparently spontaneous. Its rapid growth reflects the tense racial conditions in the urban areas of South Africa. At least 5,000 Africans were involved in the violence and arson. Similar violent but unrelated outbreaks may occur in other urban areas of South Africa within the near future as African nationalists become more organized and opposition to the government's racial policies grows. The government can be expected to maintain an uncompromising position.

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Iraq: (Prime Minister Qasim intends to appoint to his cabinet in early July four retired generals now serving in important provincial posts, [redacted] At least three of the generals are believed to be anti-Communist. Such a move would strengthen Qasim's claim that his government stands above political parties and would tend to inhibit any Communist criticism, which has so far stopped short of overt propaganda attacks on Iraqi Army leaders.) [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

Nicaragua: President Somoza and his brother, who is chief of the armed forces, are convinced that new rebel attacks are being prepared with the assistance of the Cuban, Venezuelan, and Honduran governments. The Somozas do not expect effective assistance from the Organization of American States, and the

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impulsive General Somoza has told US officials he might take offensive action against the hostile governments. The more moderate President, however, does not favor such action at present. [redacted]

LATE ITEM.

DK

*USSR-Geneva: Gromyko's consent to a three-week recess in the foreign ministers' talks reflects the Soviet leaders' awareness that their tactics at Geneva have so far failed to induce the Western powers to accept a change in the status of Berlin which would deprive them of existing rights. Moscow probably calculates that the West will be under increasing public pressure to make further concessions and that the conference will resume under conditions more favorable to the USSR. Khrushchev, in his Moscow speech on 19 June, again served notice that he would never agree to any arrangements which would perpetuate Western occupation rights in West Berlin indefinitely. However, he refrained from issuing any threats of early unilateral action to sign a separate peace treaty and transfer access controls to the East Germans. Khrushchev reaffirmed the USSR's desire for a negotiated settlement, termed the Geneva talks as having "definite positive value," and expressed confidence that the West under pressure of public opinion will eventually agree to a summit meeting. [redacted]

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

East German Reaction to Presidential Election in West Berlin

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[redacted]
East Germany, with support from the USSR, can be expected to step up its propaganda attacks on the West German presidential election which Bonn now has announced will be held in West Berlin on 1 July. (A TASS correspondent in Geneva had warned, [redacted]

[redacted] that if Bonn's plans were not canceled
"we will react and make it uncomfortable.") [redacted]

Such harassments as might be carried out, while including some interference with civilian traffic, probably will not be such as to physically prevent the holding of the meeting. Communist leaders probably plan minor harassments, such as popular demonstrations in the city, to maintain their position that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic.

[redacted]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Racial Riot in South Africa

A spontaneous riot broke out in South Africa's important seaport of Durban on 18 June and resulted in several native deaths and a considerable number of casualties, as well as damage to 25 government and private buildings. The disorders, initiated by several thousand African women who were protesting a ban on home brewing, quickly became violent and took on racial overtones when thousands of native men joined in battling the police. The police used firearms, but took hours to regain control of the affected African districts. Press reports that numbers of Europeans had to flee for safety appear exaggerated; the African areas involved are situated several miles from the main European sections of Durban.

The rapid spread of the disorders in Durban reflects the tense racial situation in the urban areas of South Africa. African resentment over the government's repressive racial policies is growing, particularly against the orders that native women must carry identification passes and that residential areas must be segregated by race. In the case of Durban, this means that thousands of Africans must move.


South Africa is likely to have a growing number of racial riots--probably with bloodshed--in the urban areas as the influence of nationalism grows among the 10,000,000 Africans and they organize to oppose the government's racial policies. During the next few years, however, these disorders will probably not become a major threat to the government's control. Prime Minister Verwoerd may be expected to maintain an uncompromising position on racial affairs and continue to suppress African nationalism.

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Qasim May Add Army Men to Iraqi Cabinet

(In a reorganization of his cabinet expected to take place in the first part of July, Qasim intends to appoint to ministerial posts four generals now functioning as important provincial administrators, [redacted])

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Major General Abd al-Wahab Shakir, governor of Hilla Province, Major General Allah al-Din Mahmud, governor of Erbil Province, Major General Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Wahhab, governor of Basra Province, and Major General Muzhir Ismail Shawa, director general of Basra port. They are all professional military men with long army careers who were named to their present civilian positions soon after Qasim came to power on 14 July 1958. While the views of Shakir are not definitely known, the generals are believed to be basically, though not vocally, anti-Communist.)

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(Qasim, [redacted] has become extremely concerned about the increasing strength and influence of the Communist party. His purpose in making these appointments to the cabinet would be to strengthen his own position and allay similar concern on the part of top army commanders. In contrast to the selection of more openly anti-Communist personalities, such appointments would strengthen Qasim's claim that his government stands above political parties and would tend to undercut Communist criticism, which has so far stopped short of overt propaganda attacks on Iraqi Army leaders.)

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(It now appears that Qasim's decision--so vehemently assailed by the Communists--to release political "exiles" who had been banished to various parts of the country was paralleled by a decision to release an unknown number of individuals who had been jailed. The American Embassy in Baghdad reports that of the ten Iraqi employees of the embassy who had been placed under arrest, at least eight have been released.) [redacted]

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III. THE WEST

Nicaraguan Regime Expects New Attacks From Abroad

The Nicaraguan Government notes mounting indications that new rebel attacks are being prepared abroad and that these probably have covert support from the Cuban and Venezuelan governments and from groups in neighboring Costa Rica and possibly also Honduras.

President Luis Somoza and his brother, General Anastasio Somoza, armed forces chief, appear uncertain of their ability to survive a concerted series of rebel incursions and do not appear to expect effective assistance from the Organization of American States. The impulsive General Somoza told US officials on 18 June that he has considered taking offensive military action against hostile governments. The President, however, does not at present favor such action.

Pro-Communist Nicaraguan exiles in Cuba announced on 17 June that one of their colleagues, Rafael Somarriba, was already inside Nicaragua in a mountainous area near the Honduran border with an armed band of guerrillas. There is no confirmation of this claim, but Somarriba is known to have left Cuba for Central America in recent weeks.

It is unlikely that the Honduran Government is assisting the Nicaraguan rebels, but its control over its border regions is limited and sympathy for the Nicaraguan rebels is high both among the Honduran public and leaders of the governing Liberal party.

Fidel Castro, who has publicly stated that the Nicaraguan rebels "have our esteem and sympathy," is probably sending covert aid to the Nicaraguan opposition. The 10 June visit to Venezuela of the commander of the Cuban Navy may have concerned Nicaragua; he was reported by the press to have had a lengthy interview with President Betancourt.

LATE ITEM

USSR Prolongs Geneva Stalemate in Attempt to Erode Western Unity

Khrushchev's speech in Moscow and Gromyko's moves at Geneva on 19 June reflect the Soviet leaders' realization that their tactics have so far failed to induce the Western powers to consent to a change in the status of Berlin which would terminate existing Allied rights in the city. Moscow agreed to a three-week recess in the Geneva talks probably on the calculation that increasing public pressure in the West for an accommodation on Berlin will erode Western unity and firmness and that the talks will resume under conditions more favorable to the USSR.

Khrushchev's intention to prolong the stalemate on the issue of Allied rights in West Berlin in the hope of extracting further Western concessions was evident in his speech at the Soviet-East German friendship meeting in Moscow. He reiterated the USSR's firm opposition to any agreement which would perpetuate Western occupation rights in West Berlin indefinitely. He sought to maintain pressure on the Western position by reaffirming Moscow's intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the Soviet-proposed all-German committee fails to agree on the principles of a peace treaty within a specified time limit. Khrushchev again stated that a separate treaty would terminate all remaining Western rights in Berlin and warned that any Western attempts to "restore the occupation regime by force" would be met by "every means at the USSR's disposal."

The Soviet premier, however, refrained from issuing any threats of early unilateral Soviet action on Berlin. He stressed his readiness to accept a time limit "acceptable to all" on the Soviet-proposed "interim settlement" for Berlin and noted that despite differences at Geneva, the talks already have had a "definite positive value."

Khrushchev also expressed confidence that the West, under pressure of public opinion, will eventually agree to a summit

meeting regardless of the outcome of the foreign ministers' talks. He contended that a summit meeting would "become even more necessary" if the ministers failed to reach agreement and warned against any Western attempt to bring pressure on the Soviet Union by linking a summit conference to progress at the foreign minister level. The USSR, he said, is not prepared "to pay any price for the sake of calling a summit conference."

Gromyko's statement on 19 June extending the time limit of his proposed "interim" Berlin settlement from one year to 18 months and providing for a resumption of four-power talks if the all-German committee fails to reach agreement within this period was intended to demonstrate once more that the Soviet position is negotiable. These modifications, however, do not alter the basic terms of the Soviet proposal as presented on 10 June. [redacted]

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